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will face this body in the days ahead. The article is an appraisal of President Kennedy's trade ideas. Bill White's suggestion is that there is no place for petty partisanship in the consultations, deliberations, and controversies which will arise over the new approach to our trade problems. I believe his article warrants reprinting in its entirety in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, and I ask unanimous consent that that be done.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

THE NEEDS AN ADULT APPROACH—APPRAISAL OF KENNEDY'S TRADE IDEAS IS NO PLACE FOR PETTY PARTISANSHIP

(By William S. White)

The great prize of the year—and of many years to come—has now at last been formally put before the country.

That is President Kennedy's long message to Congress asking for unexampled presidential authority to cut tariffs in vast sweeps. The central purpose is to associate this Nation with the six-nation European Common Market and so to enter a new world of immensely enlarged trade with all its opportunities and all its possible trials and dangers.

For our has struck for bigness—for big things and big debates among big-minded men—is much too late now for little-ness, for little things, for little disputes among little-minded men, for petty partisanship, for girlish screaming over tags like "liberal" and "conservative," for frantic worrying over who is a Democrat and who a Republican.

For this is not a Republican issue, not a Democratic issue. This is an all-American issue.

This is not something to be resolved by a party manifesto. This is not to be decided as though it were a public housing issue. There are more good guy-bad guy contests in the opportunity is at hand for the most intelligent and the most adult, the most responsible national debate we have known since World War II. And the duty, as well as the opportunity, for just such a debate is also at hand.

Mr. Kennedy has massively influential support here—from the largest of large businesses, from the most articulate, generally, of the private voices of this country; from such outstanding Republicans as Dwight D. Eisenhower and former Secretary of State Christian Herter.

The opposition, actual and latent, is more dispersed and, on the whole, less blessed with "names." It is, however, a formidable and honest opposition which is entitled to be heard in full respect and understanding. For it is no good denying that this plan will work some scattered hardship, among communities and industries which have thus far remained economically going concerns only through the assistance of tariff protection.

It is also no good denying that the vast changes upon which we propose to embark will raise new problems, economic problems of kinds with which we have not yet dealt. It is also no good denying that the European end, at least, of this proposed new trade association, the Common Market, ultimately will find itself facing poignant new political problems, too. For in Europe the push for trade will reach more and more toward political union as well. In the end will come some undeniable loss or dilution of individual national sovereignty.

Now, in all the circumstances, it is conceivable that President Kennedy could simulate his bill through Congress, give the power and prestige of his forces. He did not wisely do this, however. For

this is a historic and capital matter entitled to the most earnest and searching scrutiny by Congress and by every responsible adult in this country.

This correspondent, for one, does not hesitate to say that he is for the plan. All his life he has believed that freer world trade would cure most of the world's troubles. Moreover the enormous Western trade grouping in prospect here would make the free world so strong as to make a farce of Khrushchev's threat to "bury" that world by his own slave economy.

But let the protectionists be heard to the end—again, heard in full respect and understanding. For this great national decision will be no good and will not endure unless it has been reached at last in a free, and an informed national consent.

## CASTRO AND CASTROISM

Mr. McGEE. Mr. President, there appears in the Washington Post of today an article in which Walter Lippmann takes his usual objective view of a very controversial and troublesome question now in our midst; namely, that of Castro and Castroism. In the article Mr. Lippmann utters a word of caution to those who would act impetuously, particularly as they react to the attitude of some of our neighbors to the south on the Castro question. It is Mr. Lippmann's view that we should be a little more tolerant and a little more understanding of the caution exhibited by some of our friends to the south of us. I believe that the entire article warrants reprinting in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, and I ask unanimous consent that that be done.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

### CASTRO AND CASTROISM

(By Walter Lippmann)

The Castro problem is how to deal with a hostile regime without using military force to overthrow it. The Foreign Ministers at Punta del Este have been seeking the beginning of a solution for that problem. Castro has no avowed and quite certainly no genuine sympathizers and supporters among the Governments of the American Republics. But there has been an important division of view as to what it is wise and expedient to do about him.

The division, as we have learned, is between the Republics which lie on the shores of the Caribbean facing Cuba and, with the rather special exception of Mexico, the big countries of South America which are a long way by sea or land from the troubled Caribbean.

I would venture a guess that this geography explains the theoretical differences between the so-called soft and hard positions at the Conference. The Caribbean countries which have taken the hard line, are physically within reach of Cuba. The distances by sea and air are fairly short, and it is rather easy for Castro's revolutionists to infiltrate countries around the Caribbean, to do gun running to local rebel bands among them.

But the big South American countries, which are separated from Cuba in the Caribbean by the Andes Mountains, the jungles and the great hump of Brazil, are not directly threatened by armed intervention. For them the danger of Castro comes primarily from his legend as the Robin Hood who has robbed the rich to help the poor.

Castro does send propaganda and agitators into southern South America. He uses diplomatic facilities if he has diplomatic relations and if not, borrows the facilities of

European and Asian nations which are sympathetic with him. But all this activity of little consequence as compared with the legend of Castroism, the legend that Castro is the friend of the poor.

The "soft" group of governments have acted as they have acted not because they want to help Castro, and not because they are afraid to anger him, but because they know that legends are not destroyed by strong adjectives. The legend would not be dissolved by breaking diplomatic relations and driving Castro entirely into the underground. The legend would not be destroyed by economic embargoes especially since Cuba has no important trade with Latin America.

From our point of view it would have been a calamity if we had forced the issue to a point where with the backing of the weakest part of Latin America we overrode the views of the strongest part. It would have been a calamity to win such a victory because it would have split the Inter-American system, with twice as many Latin Americans opposed to us as were with us.

What we really needed, and perhaps have gotten, is that a preponderant majority of our American neighbors state clearly that Castro and Castroism are hostile to the Inter-American system. When that is achieved, the practical question of what to do about Castro is not a matter of words or of sanctions. It is a matter of coordinated and cooperative counterespionage in this hemisphere. That must be largely a secret operation in order to identify and frustrate subversive agents. It cannot be done with a brass band and a television camera but only by close working arrangements among the Governments.

Effective counterespionage can deal with Castro's interventions in this hemisphere. It will not and cannot deal with his legend, with Castroism. Counterespionage will not save the corrupt dictatorships that still remain. It will not save the incompetent democracies. And while there must be counterespionage to make sure Castro minds his own business in Cuba, it is no substitute for doing what the alliance for progress has promised to do.

## DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

The Senate resumed the consideration of the nomination of John A. McCone, of California, to be Director of Central Intelligence.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I have been listening with much interest to the debate on the question of confirmation of the nomination of John A. McCone to be Director of Central Intelligence.

I realize that this position is a highly sensitive and most difficult one. I do not know Mr. McCone intimately, but I do know him to a degree; and I have observed his service as an Under Secretary for the Air Force, in a Democratic administration; as Chairman of the Joint Commission on Atomic Energy, under a Republican administration; and as the appointee under the Democratic administration of President Kennedy to be head of the Central Intelligence Agency—the nomination which the Senate is now called upon to consider, and about which it must reach a decision.

Mr. McCone has proved to be a most efficient, effective, and patriotic servant of this Government. He has served in positions of great trust and responsibility, and he has executed his duties faithfully and well.